Naval Spetsnaz capability!
The modern concept of Naval Spetsnaz Brigades were formed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Although there were outside influences, the Soviets invested heavily in home-grown technology and doctrine which caused a significant divergence from the Western model. In the Soviet model Naval Spetsnaz Brigades were tasked with reconnaissance (both across the beach and of underwater defenses, landing zones etc), preparation of pre-emptive strikes (e.g. placing nuclear mines in enemy and neutral ports and waterways) and preparation of coastal raids, particularly on the remote radar and SOSUS outposts. The extent to which they conducted cross-border operations during the Cold War is open to discussion although the widespread view is that they did. The belief is that because of the covert nature of their operations and lower likelihood of compromise Naval Spetsnaz got more cross-border time than their army colleagues. This logic still holds true today.
Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991 the Naval Spetsnaz Brigades went through the same period of neglect as other units and, more recently, have taken on more Western influences again. However, the flavor of Naval Spetsnaz is still very Russian.
In Hybrid Warfare Naval Special Forces can adapt to several tasks:
- Location, identification, tapping and disruption of underwater communications cables;
- Observation of ‘enemy’ naval exercises;
- Coastal raids which can be passed off as carried out by aligned irregular military units notionally outside Russia’s control;
- Kidnapping of high-value targets within reach of coast;
- Low-level sabotage and ‘show of force’ missions intended to frustrate, distract and intimidate enemies;
- Making up for limited conventional naval assets during sudden flare-ups in conflict;
- Training and equipping waterborne saboteurs of aligned irregular/rebel units.
These are just a few, the reader is invited to think up more. The only point is that Special Forces, particularly maritime ones, are particularly suited to low-level conflicts where a degree of deniability is required.
In Soviet doctrine the primary way for Spetsnaz divers to get into the water was by parachute, sometimes even jumping with their DPVs strapped to their bodies. Air mobility still has some relevance but for Hybrid Warfare we should expect a more subtle approach: submarine. The Russians have never adopted Dry Deck Shelters (DDS) (remember, only the SEALs and SBS have those!) or even lock-out chambers in patrol submarines (SSKs) so any Spetsnaz infiltrating NATO shores will have to exit the boat Soviet style: through the torpedo tubes. This is a comparatively dangerous and uncomfortable way to exit or enter a submarine and generally requires the sub to bottom-out in shallow water. Divers, DPVs and any gear need to be hauled out of the claustrophobic confines. Another common method is from boats or quasi-civilian surface ships which may also act as mother-ships for SDV operations.
In Soviet doctrine the primary way for Spetsnaz divers to get into the water was by parachute, sometimes even jumping with their DPVs strapped to their bodies. Air mobility still has some relevance but for Hybrid Warfare we should expect a more subtle approach: submarine. The Russians have never adopted Dry Deck Shelters (DDS) (remember, only the SEALs and SBS have those!) or even lock-out chambers in patrol submarines (SSKs) so any Spetsnaz infiltrating NATO shores will have to exit the boat Soviet style: through the torpedo tubes. This is a comparatively dangerous and uncomfortable way to exit or enter a submarine and generally requires the sub to bottom-out in shallow water. Divers, DPVs and any gear need to be hauled out of the claustrophobic confines. Another common method is from boats or quasi-civilian surface ships which may also act as mother-ships for SDV operations.
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